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Introduction 
 
In their important discussion paper presenting person-
centred medicine (PCM) as ‘an emergent model of modern 
clinical practice’ [1], Miles and Mezzich note a rather 
obvious comparison between the rhetoric of their own 
favoured ‘model’ and the rhetoric of the evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) movement. For all their differences, PCM 
and EBM have something in common. While we may 
disagree about what evidence is or indeed just not be sure 
what it is, we are generally agreed that we are in favour of 
it. A movement that is all about promoting the use of 
evidence in medicine sounds about as uncontroversial as it 
gets. I might be oblivious to scientific debates about the 
nature of evidence and have no idea how to define the 
term, but I know that I want anyone treating me to use 
evidence, all the same. I may wonder what else medical 
decisions should be based on, if not evidence? [2]. 
Similarly, it would make very little sense to be ‘against’ 
persons. I may have never given a moment’s thought to 
philosophical disputes about the nature of persons, but I 
know that however one defines persons, I am one of them 
and in reply to the question: ‘Should medicine care for 
persons or not?’ few would answer in the negative. Again, 
I might wonder: if medicine is not about caring for ‘the 
person’, then what is it about? 
Miles and Mezzich are therefore quite right to worry 
that ‘the nomenclature of “person-centred medicine’ risks 
the accusation that such a term represents a ‘further 
rhetorical addition to the already rhetorically overburdened 
nature of health services’ [1]. Practitioners struggling to do 
their jobs in the resource-constrained environments of 
contemporary health services may well react cynically to 
the latest linguistic innovation, especially if it seems, like 
its predecessors, to combine the blindingly obvious with 
the ‘revolutionary’ [3]. People are rightly suspicious of any 
movement, model, approach or paradigm, that purports to 
have the potential to improve practices in some substantial 
way, but is at the same time apparently founded on claims 
that fail what Charlton has called ‘the platitude test’ [4]. 
Insofar as there is a legitimate worry here, it is worth 
being very clear about what that worry is. The problem 
with evidence-based medicine was not that the term 
‘evidence’ is contested. Of course it is and it is right that its 
proper meaning and application in a range of medical 
contexts will continue to be debated, whether in future we 
talk about evidence-based medicine or, as Miles and 
Mezzich recommend, evidence-informed medicine. The 
problem was with the use made of the rhetorical properties 
of the term by prominent figures in the EBM movement. 
Despite repeated allusions to the ‘evolution’ of the debate 
in the EBM literature [5-8], key contributors from the 
outset had little time for the idea of an on-going process of 
intellectual evolution [9-11], preferring instead to declare 
their own work the ‘dawn’ of a new ‘era’, a radical break 
with the past and a dramatic conceptual ‘shift’ [12]. 
Authors sought to speak definitively on the nature of 
evidence, to set a new ‘standard’ [13] and the whole point 
of the language lifted from Kuhn [14] of ‘paradigm shifts’ 
and ‘scientific revolutions’ [12,13] was, precisely, to 
emphasise the lack of scope for any meaningful dialogue 
between EBM’s understanding of ‘evidence’ and ideas 
derived in the dark era of ‘traditional medicine’, prior to 
the EBM dawn. The notion that reasonable people might 
disagree, significantly, about the nature of evidence, was 
one that never really took hold within the EBM 
community. 
So the problem with EBM was the implicit denial of 
the contested nature of its key term, ‘evidence’.  Critics 
were assumed to have misunderstood, which is why 
responses to academic criticism took the form not of 
counter-argument, but of ‘clarification’ [15]. The famous 
explanation of what EBM ‘is and isn’t’ presented by 
Sackett and colleagues (‘the conscientious, explicit and 
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions 
about the care of individual patients’) was platitudinous, 
but the problem with the paper was that it traded on the 
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platitudinous nature of that explanation, while clearly, at 
the same time, assuming a more substantive conception of 
‘evidence’ and maintaining that, in some semantically 
significant sense, all medicine should be ‘based on’ that 
account of evidence.  When these authors (and authors 
who followed them [5-8,16]) proceeded as though their 
contested claims about the nature and role of evidence in 
medicine were somehow vindicated, simply by repeated 
association with platitudes, they committed a rhetorical 
fallacy, affecting a position at once platitudinous (such that 
no reasonable disagreement with it is possible) and 
substantial (‘radical’, ‘revolutionary’, etc.). Effectively, 
they claimed ‘ownership’ of the language of ‘medical 
evidence’, treating a once common term (open to a range 
of legitimate interpretations) as a technical term, which 
EBM authors had the authority to define stipulatively – 
thus rendering any further debate about its meaning 
superfluous [17]. The success of this rhetorical enterprise 
is in part confirmed by the fact that such astute critics of 
EBM as Tonelli elected not to contest the meaning of the 
term ‘evidence’, in effect ‘giving it up’ to the EBM camp, 
preferring instead to dispute the dominance of EBM by 
speaking of non-evidential warrants for clinical decision-
making [18,19]. Indeed, for much of the time, when Miles 
and Mezzich speak of ‘evidence’, they mean what they call 
‘the E of EBM’ and this is why the shift from ‘evidence-
based’ to ‘evidence-informed’ medicine is important for 
them [1]. 
Logically similar rhetorical strategies can be found in  
the literature on the application of management and 
organisational theory to healthcare and education [20-22] 
and also in some of the more ‘applied’ work in the field of 
bioethics [22-24]. Authors in these areas routinely and 
swiftly moved from assertions about the desirability of 
‘organisational quality’ and ‘a rigorous commitment to 
promoting ethical practice’ (ideas no-one could seriously 
dispute) to deeply contentious claims about the desirability 
of greater control of professional practice by monitoring 
agencies, line-management structures and regulatory ethics 
committees. Ironically and, I think worryingly, those 
authors willing to commit what any first year logic student 
would recognise as a basic fallacy (treating a contentious 
thesis as though it follows deductively from a platitude or 
set of platitudes) have often been rewarded in professional 
terms, in that their work has had an ‘impact’ on the 
thinking of policymakers [20-22] – that section of the 
population most in the market for ‘miracle cures’ for our 
social, organisational and professional ills (or rather, for 
something they can present as a miracle cure). As I have 
noted elsewhere, pointing out that overworked 
practitioners need more time off and more support, is 
unlikely to further the career of an ambitious researcher. 
On the other hand: ‘[a]n insight at once so radical as to 
require a revolution in practice and so just-plain-obvious as 
to require no defence might sound too good to be true, but 
to politicians searching for a “big idea”, it is just the ticket’ 
[3]. In terms of their real methodologies, ‘quality 
management’ and evidence-based medicine have virtually 
nothing in common, but they were both (simultaneously) 
heralded in government literature as key components or 
‘central planks’ of UK health policy [25,26]. Arguably, 
their appeal had much to do with the little they do have in 
common – a willingness on the part of their protagonists to 
abuse the rhetorical properties of their defining terms, to 
produce ‘solutions’ that can be defended with reference to 
a few, rhetorically appealing phrases, but which at the 
same time can be presented as having ‘ground-breaking’ 
implications for policy and practice [17,20]. 
 
 
Implications for person-centred 
medicine 
 
The worry for PCM, then, is that the rhetorical properties 
of its defining terms present authors in the field with the 
sorts of temptation to which protagonists of the approaches 
mentioned above typically and all too readily succumbed. 
Following Peabody [27], Miles and Mezzich [1] explicate 
PCM with reference to the ‘soul’ of the clinic.  For the 
ancients, one common use of ‘soul’ (or ‘form’) was to 
identify that which gave a person or organism integrity, the 
holding together of components of the whole in balance, to 
sustain proper functioning [28]. In this sense, there are two 
ways that PCM can lose its ‘soul’ and the challenge for 
PCM as the debate about its nature and direction develops 
will be to maintain a proper balance between these two 
tempting, but destructive extremes. 
On the one hand, focussing on the general, ‘every day’ 
meaning of the term ‘person’1, provides an easy way to 
explain to workers and policymakers too ‘busy’ to listen to 
any ‘intellectual ruminations’ [7,11], that one is not saying 
anything fundamentally incompatible with whatever they 
believe already and indeed the proposition that medicine 
should be ‘person-centred’ is so straightforward as to be 
virtually self-evident. The price paid for such automatic 
plausibility is a high one: it leaves PCM too vague a 
doctrine to be of any practical use. It allows the claim that 
medicine should be person-centred to mean just whatever 
the listener already takes it to mean, making it too 
subjective an idea to determine any specific conclusions 
for policy and practice. 
To resist this temptation, authors might be tempted 
instead to issue some definitive statements to explain what 
PCM means, to ‘clarify’ what PCM ‘is and isn’t’. The 
problem here is the risk of laying down the law about what 
is, in fact, rightly, a contested matter. The meaning of 
‘person’ and related concepts has by no means been 
‘settled’, nor is there a broad consensus regarding what, 
precisely, it means to say that ‘the person’ should be at the 
‘centre’ of medicine. The tendency to appropriate terms 
from common discourse and treat them as technical terms, 
defined authoritatively within one’s own specific 
theoretical frame, is a common one for academics. 
Throughout this paper, I have treated the plural of ‘person’ 
not as the more usual ‘people’, but as ‘persons’, a term 
                                                          
1 The one that would enable Richard Dawkins and The Pope, 
despite their philosophical differences, to agree that they needed 
two dinner passes between them, in the unlikely event of their 
attending the same conference and being told that the organisers 
allocated ‘one pass per person’. 
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found more often in philosophical discussions of 
‘personhood’, without (until now!), even noting or noticing 
that there is a difference. 
The most serious threat to the ‘soul’ of PCM is the 
possibility of giving way to both temptations at once, to 
combine (perhaps even in the course of the same paper) 
both extremes with shameless inconsistency, to insist on 
employing both the self-evident and some quite specific, 
technical meaning of ‘person-centred’, while refusing to 
recognise any distinction worth mentioning between them. 
This was the path chosen by the protagonists of 
management theory and EBM and, as noted, it can yield 
professional rewards. (That is, one assumes, what makes it 
such a serious temptation).  By giving the impression that 
one has (yet another) miraculous combination of the 
revolutionary and the blindingly obvious, one supplies 
what many policymakers understand by a theory with 
‘practical applications’ [20]. That way lies impact and 
perhaps further funding [3,4]. What, then, is the virtuous 
alternative, the way for contributors to this debate to say 
something ‘at once true and helpful’ [22], while 
recognising and avoiding the dangers inherent in the 
project? 
The more difficult middle ground lies in recognising 
the nature and limitations of the contribution that 
theoretical approaches can make to practice and the 
importance of fostering an on-going, intellectually serious 
debate about practice that involves all concerned – most 
notably practitioners and patients. To me, the most 
important contribution of Miles and Mezzich [1,29] and 
other contributors to this area [30-35], lies not in their 
specific conclusions, but in their relentless determination 
to remind us that, despite the triumphalism of earlier 
academic movements, the underlying and typically naïve 
questions about what medicine is all about have not been 
resolved.  We need to revisit these underlying questions – 
about the purpose and value of medical interventions, the 
nature of the clinical encounter and medical knowledge – 
which frame our thinking about practice, precisely to avoid 
their becoming effectively (and arbitrarily) settled by 
default.   
At the moment, PCM seems to be defined at least as 
much by what it rejects as by what it proposes.  Certainly, 
Miles and Mezzich from the outset explain PCM as, in no 
small part, a reaction to conceptions of practice influenced 
too heavily by reductionist accounts of the person and the 
sort of narrow scientism that threatens to reduce both 
professional judgement and patient care to forms of 
technocratic ‘know-how’ [1]. Some will treat this as a 
weakness, thinking that ‘negativity’ is always a bad thing 
and only ‘positive proposals’ are valuable.  In fact, it is 
crucially important for any intellectually serious proposal 
to be clear about what it rules out and ‘negative’ 
contributions to an on-going debate are every bit as 
important as ‘positive’ ones [22]. That is the whole point 
of Charlton’s platitude test: to say what something means 
you need to be able to say what it denies, as a proposal 
compatible with everything in fact asserts nothing [4]. 
(Whatever the problems with the logical positivist 
movement, this particular insight – that a claim which 
denies nothing typically asserts nothing – is one that the 
work of positivists such as the early Ayer [36] very much 
impressed upon our intellectual culture and for that they 
deserve much credit). There is also, in the writings of 
Miles and Mezzich [1,29], as well as other authors in this 
area [31,37-40], more than a hint of a return of virtue 
ethics, the desire to revive a serious conception of wisdom 
as at the heart of professional practice and the idea that we 
need to rethink certain ‘modern’ dichotomies, including 
the distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’: a truly 
rational human being is a well-balanced person, with 
empathic and other emotional capacities being essential 
components of human rationality. 
All of these ideas are important and indicative of a 
desire to reframe our thinking about medical practice and 
to revive aspects of thinking and practice that are in danger 
of being lost in the current environment. But we should not 
aim to resolve decisively what PCM implies for practice. 
We should accept that distinct and even incompatible ideas 
about persons, virtue, professional judgement, patient 
autonomy and the relationship between individuals and the 
community, will be entertained by people who can all, 
nonetheless, have a legitimate claim to characterise their 
thinking in terms of the language of person-centred 
medicine. It is not a language that anyone should come to 
‘own’. 
Will this not make PCM too subjective, in the sense I 
was worrying about earlier in the paper? Not necessarily. 
There is an important distinction between an idea that is 
‘subjective’, in a sense that implies it can mean anything 
you like and its being ‘contested’ in a way that implies not 
only that reasonable people disagree about what it means, 
but also that they are likely to disagree for the foreseeable 
future. There is, in fact, nothing wrong with noting the 
centrality of both evidence and persons in any defensible 
account of medical practice, so long as one acknowledges 
that these ideas are contested. The danger arises when, in 
the desire to be seen to say something substantive and 
practical, one then lays down the law about what a term 
must mean, ruling out, without adequate argument, 
alternative conceptions to one’s own. This sort of linguistic 
legislation aims to bring an abrupt end to intellectual 
debate, to declare that, for the subject matter at hand, 
intellectual history has now reached its resolution, that it 
has come to an end. Far from bringing advances, this 
tendency stifles real debate, reducing every discussion to a 
debate about ‘how-to’ apply certain techniques in practice. 
We do need a serious interrogation, not only of the 
crucial idea of ‘persons’, but also of what precisely it 
means to claim that medicine should be ‘centred’ on 
persons. In what follows, I will say something about the 
specific claims of Miles and Mezzich on these points, not 
with a desire to resolve the issues, but in the hope of 
raising some questions and objections that might further 
the debate. 
 
 
A Hegelian synthesis? 
 
Miles and Mezzich propose that PCM is a Hegelian 
synthesis of EBM and Patient Centred Care (PCC) [1]. 
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This follows earlier claims [41] that we are at a ‘Hegelian 
moment’ in the history of the debate about medical 
epistemology and ethics. In contrast to the language of a 
paradigm shift, which (as noted above) emphasises the lack 
of continuity and dialogue between what one is proposing 
and what has gone before, this Hegelian terminology 
suggests continuity and development, an approach 
somehow growing out of what has gone before in the 
course of intellectual exchange and progress. As defenders 
of EBM are finally beginning to engage in serious dialogue 
with those from outside the EBM camp [42,43] and as 
some are preferentially using the language of ‘evidence-
informed’ as opposed to ‘evidence-based’ medicine (a 
language traditional opponents of EBM are much happier 
to accept and with good reason [1,41]), it is right to look 
for ways to combine the insights of previously opposed 
approaches. As a co-author of an editorial calling for a 
‘Hegelian moment’, I have no objection to the general idea 
of a synthesis between previously distinct traditions: 
 
‘That is to say, we are at a point in the history of 
medicine when insights from approaches that have, 
historically, been set up in opposition to each other (the 
focus on improving the science of medicine and the 
focus on medicine as a caring, human, occupation, 
whose practitioners and patients are persons, with all 
this entails) might be fully reconciled. Rather than 
subordinating one approach to the other, rather than 
privileging one side of the picture and then puzzling 
over how to re-integrate the other, we look forward to 
the proper synthesis of these approaches. The challenge 
of medical humanities is as intellectually serious and 
practically urgent as medical science and we look 
forward to the development of accounts of medicine that 
do full justice to its human and social complexity, 
drawing on the full range of sources that form our 
intellectual heritage – in science, ethics, philosophy and 
allied humanities.’ [41] 
 
I am, however, a little more cautious about presenting 
PCM as the product of a synthesis between the specific 
doctrines designated by the initials EBM and PCC, 
respectively. One of the things its advocates hope PCM 
will do (and this is evident in a number of places in the 
Miles & Mezzich discussion paper [1]) is to defend the 
idea of the clinician as a person being entitled to use 
her/his professional expertise and outlook to make 
judgements – of course, informed by the evidence and in 
dialogue with the judgements of the patient (where 
'judgements' reflect both a person's broad background 
assumptions and world-view as well as more clearly 
subjective, but potentially extremely important things such 
as preferences). The crucial idea expressed by Henry that 
‘the clinical encounter is an interaction between persons’ 
[34], requires that both parties have something distinctive 
to bring and, in particular, that the professional is not 
reduced to the role of one delivering a ‘product’ to 
requirements drawn up by the patient as a ‘consumer’ of 
care. 
Miles and Mezzich reference Berwick [1,44] as a 
representative of PCC. This author was previously a 
contributor to the quality management debate [22,45] and 
as Meaghre notes [46], he advances what is very much a 
‘consumerist’ model of the patient-professional 
relationship. Miles and Mezzich recognise this aspect of 
the PCC literature when they note that they, in contrast to 
proponents of PCC, do not recognise the obligation to care 
for patients ‘on their own terms’, with ‘a clinician as a 
simple provider of goods’ [1]. Arguably, and despite being 
‘poles apart’ in the ways Miles and Mezzich bring out, 
EBM and PCC both won support from policymakers, at 
least in part because they helped to contribute to an anti-
professional agenda that was part and parcel of the 
‘managerial revolution’ [20-22]. Some of the work on PCC 
(including Berwick’s [44]) resonates with all the literature 
about championing the service-user against the dominance 
of professionals, while EBM relegates ‘expert opinion’ to a 
form of low-grade evidence and treats the need for 
professional judgement as indicative of a regrettable lack 
of evidence [39]. Looked at in that way, it is harder to 
work out how either position contains the potential, when 
merged with the other, to give rise to a re-introduction of a 
strong sense of the value of professional judgement and of 
the inescapability of judgement.  
So the portrayal of PCM as the synthesis of PCC and 
EBM, though extremely appealing, looks a bit too neat to 
me to represent the real nature of these distinct positions. 
Rather, what we are looking for is a synthesis of the 
sciences and the humanities in medicine, an end to the 
futile and tedious insistence that these aspects are 
fundamentally opposed, that medicine is ‘really’ a science, 
but with a human side, rather than a human activity that 
employs insights from a wide range of disciplines in the 
cause of promoting the human good. 
 
 
The human animal and political 
animals 
 
The debate about the nature of the person in 
philosophy spans the philosophy of mind and action, ethics 
and political philosophy and, if PCM is to avoid providing 
‘quick fix’ solutions and to encourage, instead, an 
intellectually serious debate about the fundamental 
questions facing medicine, then it cannot altogether avoid 
these areas. Miles and Mezzich state that the patient is a 
person ‘because he has personhood which, as Schaffner 
has argued, signifies human agency in all levels of being 
and in all contexts’ [29]. This model of a person needs a 
good deal more attention than can be given here, but it 
sounds like quite a demanding criterion of personhood and, 
as a general rule, the harder it is to satisfy the paradigm of 
a ‘person’ being employed, the more defenders of PCM are 
going to have to qualify what they mean by ‘centred’. I do 
not believe Miles and Mezzich would want to see medical 
interventions restricted to ‘persons’ in any strong sense, as 
this would suggest that human subjects falling short of the 
model of ‘personhood’ in some way would fall outside the 
scope of legitimate medical concern. Would they be happy 
to see those humans with diminished agency, referred to by 
some philosophers as ‘marginal cases’ [47], relegated to 
the margins of medical concern (one possible reading of 
the claims that ‘persons’ are essentially ‘agents’ and that 
they should be the ‘centre’ of medicine)? I am certain that 
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they would not, but this suggests that greater clarification 
of the implications of the key terminology of ‘person-
centredness’ is still needed. 
The authors may be happy to endorse Peabody’s claim 
that ‘disease in man is never the same as disease in an 
experimental animal, because in man disease at once 
affects and is affected by what we call the emotional life’ 
[48]. While Peabody has an important point about the way 
the experience of disease influences and is influenced by 
the specific conditions of an individual’s life, I see no need 
for PCM to commit itself to any highly controversial thesis 
to the effect that there is an absolute cognitive and 
affective divide between human creatures and the animals 
from which they evolved. There is nothing particularly 
‘scientific’ about such a belief [49,50], nor is there 
anything resembling a philosophical consensus on the 
capacities of non-human animals to experience distress, 
anxiety, empathy and other emotions [50-53]. Indeed, it is 
arguable that we possess some of our distinctively human 
features because we are mammals of a certain sort 
[49,50,53-55] and some recent challenges to scientism 
have stressed the biological side to human rationality as 
part of an account of what is missing from the unduly 
abstract views of human reasoning and knowledge found 
in reductionist accounts of the human animal [39,49,53-
55]. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Miles and Mezzich certainly recognise that no model of 
‘personhood’ can be both substantive and politically 
neutral, such that a full account of PCM will make 
reference to how we conceive of our rights and duties in 
the context of a broader social order that delimits the scope 
and provides the resources for medical interventions 
[1,29]. This supplies another reason to stress the contested 
nature of PCM, as it would be bizarre indeed to hope for a 
broad political consensus shared by all who may have a 
legitimate claim to characterise their thinking in terms of 
the language of person-centred medicine. As the discourse 
develops, we may well see different versions of PCM 
emerging, influenced by alternative communitarian and 
individualist approaches to personhood and this will at 
least help to make more transparent the relationship 
between our background assumptions and the conclusions 
we draw about resource allocation and value in healthcare 
– assumptions too often disguised by pseudo-scientific 
devices to quantify value and ‘rationalise’ the processes of 
resource allocation [22].  
I must admit to having some concerns about the 
authors’ keenness to stress the potential for PCM to cut 
costs [1,29]. While no-one wants to waste vital health 
resources (again, apply the platitude test), one hope for 
PCM is that it might be that it causes us to reconsider how 
we employ the evaluative concept of ‘waste’ in a range of 
areas. As well as reassuring policymakers that the 
approach need not require an increase in health 
expenditure, we may also offer a model to service users 
and practitioners that enables them to explain the 
contribution their services make to human flourishing (to 
employ an ‘outdated’ term in urgent need of revival [55]) 
and indeed to challenge the social order in which they 
operate to explain its priorities with reference to its 
concern for the value of the persons who make up its body 
politic. What PCM means and what it might represent in 
future, are still very much ‘up for grabs’ at this stage of the 
debate. 
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